
*U.S. Interventions in Latin
America since World War II*

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INTRODUCTION

At a time of increased involvement of great powers in Central America and the Caribbean following an unprecedentedly large war in the South Atlantic between a declining great power and a South American country, it seems fitting to reexamine the history of U.S. intervention in Latin America.¹ A better understanding of the past should make it possible not only to appreciate the uniqueness of recent conflicts, but also to see the continuities.

Latin America has been largely within the sphere of influence of the United States, especially since the end of World War II. A sphere of influence in a bipolar world is "an engagement between two states that one of them will abstain from interfering or exercising influences within certain territories which as between the contracting parties are reserved for the operation of the other."² One of the key debates in contemporary American politics is the extent to which Latin America is no longer the exclusive preserve of the United States. The involvement of the Soviet Union (mainly through Cuba) in Nicaragua and claims by the Reagan administration of Soviet-Cuban support of the rebels in El Salvador have occupied headlines intermittently since the fall of Somoza. Controversy about a Soviet brigade on Cuba caused a crucial delay in Senate

confirmation of the SALT II treaty in the summer of 1979 (the SALT II treaty was not subsequently confirmed). Similarly, greater European involvement in the current Central American turmoil, and especially strong French support for the Contadora process at a time when the Reagan administration opposed negotiations with the rebels in El Salvador, also suggested a decline in the exclusivity of U.S. influence.

In addition to the decline in exclusivity of influence, there appeared to be some major shifts in tactics, especially when the Reagan administration took office. Renewed support for "friendly" dictators was the avowed goal of the new policy.³ Jeane Kirkpatrick provided the Reagan forces with an effective criticism of the Carter administration in the 1980 election campaign by arguing that greater U.S. support for the shah of Iran and for Somoza in Nicaragua might have resulted in the preservation of friendly regimes. Support for friendly dictators implied a major retreat from the earlier policies of opposing regimes with a consistent record of violations of basic human rights, along with a greater stress on military aid to repressive regimes confronted at home with insurgencies. Also, the Reagan administration seemed less reluctant than previous administrations to threaten direct military intervention either to prevent the coming to power of unfriendly leftist regimes (El Salvador) or to overthrow existing unfriendly regimes (Grenada and Nicaragua).

According to Michael Stohl, terrorism is "the purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat."⁴ State terror is the use of terrorism by the governments of nation-states. According to Stohl, therefore, some forms of intervention are acts of state terror by the intervening state. For example, a military intervention designed to create a generate climate of fear and uncertainty, and hence compliance with the wishes of the intervening government, would be an act of state terror. While one might quarrel with Stohl's definition of terror for being overly broad, his argument points out the importance of coercion or coercive threats in intervention. Great power interventions in regions considered to be under the sphere of influence of one power by that very power will take the form of state terror whenever the maintenance of "friendly" regimes seems to that state to require the use of coercion or threats to create an atmosphere conducive to compliance. Thus, one might say that the Reagan administration, at least in its first two years, by advocating clandestine military actions in Nicaragua and supporting the use of terror by military forces in El Salvador, demonstrated a desire to implement an explicit policy of state terror. It will be argued here that the preexisting policy was an implicit policy of state terror and thus that the change has been primarily one of public doctrine rather than in actual policies.

A possible explanation for the decline in the exclusivity of U.S. influence in the region and the recent tendency to adopt explicit policies of state

terror would be a general decline in the power of the United States. This would be consistent with a line of theorizing that has become fashionable in works on the politics of the international economic system.⁵ Declining hegemony, as a general explanation of multiple phenomena, seems to be deficient in a number of respects. It is not clear, for example, that the United States has suffered anything other than a minor relative decline in military power with respect to the Soviet Union (but no other nation), while its supposed decline in economic power seems more the consequence of the recovery of Europe and Japan from the ravages of World War II than a whittling away of U.S. power (which still remains substantial). Nevertheless, there has been a decline in the power of the United States relative to its major adversary and its allies, which has produced some important changes in behavior.

From the Marxist-Leninist perspective, intervention by capitalist states is both evidence of the continued presence of imperialism (defined by Lenin as "the highest stage of capitalism") and of its failure to control the events that it must to maintain itself. Intervention is intimately tied to modern imperialism because of the inefficiency and unfashionableness of colonial occupation and administration. Intervention by capitalist countries is designed to preserve feudal regimes in the periphery, or at least regimes sympathetic to the preservation of capitalism. Soviet views on this question, while emphasizing the central importance of preserving socialism in the Soviet Union and its allies, recognize the obligation of socialist regimes to support anti-imperialist struggles and to oppose interventions by capitalist nations. This obligation increases when it appears that capitalism is beginning to erode from within, when the "correlation of forces" favors bold action by leading socialist states.

Nevertheless, the Soviets have behaved in the past in ways which suggest that they recognize that there are spheres of influence in the world system. Not only do they recognize the possible existence of such spheres of influence, but they have shown some signs of wanting to codify, in the form of doctrines or tacit agreements between the superpowers, the exclusive right of great powers to intervene within their respective spheres of influence. Soviet behavior is not, however, the subject here. The Soviets have been careful to limit their activities in Latin America, reflecting, in the opinion of most students of Soviet foreign policy, Soviet caution in attempting to project its power so far from the Soviet Union and in the face of likely vigorous opposition from the United States. It would be very useful, however, to compare U.S. intervention in Latin America with Soviet behavior in one of the Soviet spheres of influence.⁶

In the United States, interventions by the U.S. government have resulted in a substantial amount of domestic protest and dissent. Intervention, unless it can take place in a very brief period of time and can be justified in terms of goals recognized by most of the citizenry as valid,

seems to generate considerable disagreement within the polity. There is therefore necessarily a high degree of emotional energy connected with the study of interventions. The term itself, because of its vagueness in ordinary usage and its connections with unpopular theories or ideologies, is perceived to be ideologically loaded.

DEFINING INTERVENTION

Intervention and aggression are evaluative terms used frequently in the discourse of international politics but they are rarely defined. There is no agreement in international law on the definition of the two terms. Terry Thiele argues that there are two basic perspectives on this issue: the conventional and the revisionist.⁷ The conventional defines intervention as an involvement of one state in the affairs of another that stops short of aggression.⁸ The conventional definition of intervention allowed great powers to distinguish major warlike actions from those that merely preserved existing spheres of influence. The revisionist conception takes as its point of departure the principles of nonintervention in the affairs of sovereign states and of self-determination as the cornerstone of international legitimation of regimes. By this standard, the only legitimate interventions are those which further the cause of self-determination. This, says Thiele, springs from the anticolonial struggles of the post-World-War-II period and biases the concept in favor of the destabilizing of existing regimes, since most insurgents can claim that they are furthering the cause of self-determination by freeing the nation from the bonds of imperialism and neocolonialism.⁹

Besides this lack of consensus on the legal meaning of intervention, there is some debate over the question of whether an invitation to intervene makes an intervention more justifiable, and hence more legitimate, than intervention in the absence of an invitation. This issue played a role both in the interventions of the United States in Indochina and of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In addition, there are arguments over the question of whether the ends of intervention are relevant to judgments about their legitimacy or legality. For example, some intervening countries claim that their lack of desire for annexing new territories should be considered in evaluating the legitimacy of their interventions. Finally, justification of interventions as promoting the spread of socialism, democracy, and/or human rights has been fairly common in the recent past, even though again there remains little international consensus on the legitimacy of these claims.¹⁰

The highly evaluative nature of the term is inevitable, but James Rosenau suggests that there is an underlying concept that is susceptible to

systematic study: intervention as convention-breaking activity designed to affect authority structures in another state.¹¹ Intervention should be defined as convention-breaking activity, according to Rosenau, because otherwise one might have to include a very large number of activities of dominant or influential states in weaker states that are routine and not usually considered to be interventionary. In other words, Rosenau wants to avoid the equation of intervention with influence. Intervention should be limited to activities designed to affect authority structures because that limitation captures the essentially political nature of intervention.¹² Richard Little accepts Rosenau's basic approach, but suggests that intervention should refer only to actions in which the activity of the intervening country is designed to affect the outcome of an internal dispute between at least two parties in the other state.¹³ This definition excludes interventions designed merely to affect the policies of the government of the target state independently of domestic disputes and does not seem to be widely accepted by other scholars.

The main problem with Rosenau's definition is that it does not suggest how one is to decide what sorts of behavior are or are not "convention-breaking." We have seen already that there is some disagreement on conventions connected with national sovereignty and the right of great powers to intervene within their spheres of influence. Rosenau's definition, while it is a valiant attempt to produce a more scientific approach to the phenomenon of intervention, not only fails to provide criteria for identifying conventions but also inadequately defines "authority structures" that are supposedly threatened by interventions. Presumably, he uses the term in preference to "government" in order not to rule out interventions designed to affect the outcome of civil wars and insurgencies, where an alternative source of authority is challenging the one implicit in the existing government. But, as it stands, Rosenau's definition remains too vague for operationalization in systematic studies.

Fred Pearson, the author of a series of quantitative studies on intervention, defines intervention as "the movement of troops or military forces by one independent country, or a group of countries in concert, across the border of another independent country (or colony of an independent country), or actions by troops already stationed in the target country."¹⁴ This definition is motivated by a desire to avoid using fuzzy terms like "convention-breaking" and "authority structures" so that data analysis can proceed on the basis of military movements. The cost of this strategy is to limit the study of intervention merely to military interventions (which are not always the most interesting for theoretical purposes) and to include under the category some actions that would not normally be so classified. William Eckhardt and Edward Azar use a similar definition of intervention, but appear to be more aware of the desirability of extending the study of intervention to at least some nonmilitary actions.¹⁵

This panoply of definitions illustrates the perpetual tug of war that seems to go on between those who would circumscribe the meaning of the term in order to facilitate empirical study (while inevitably including and excluding some events that do not seem quite appropriate to others), and those who prefer to define intervention as something quite similar to "domination," or, more diffusely, "influence" in international affairs. For our purposes, the former strategy will be adopted, but not without trepidation. By extending the meaning of the term somewhat beyond that used by Pearson, Eckhardt, and Azar, it is hoped that some of the disadvantages of their earlier studies may be eliminated.

It will be useful, first of all, to distinguish between military and nonmilitary interventions. We can more or less accept Pearson's definition as good enough for the study of military interventions. There are two basic types of nonmilitary interventions: diplomatic and transgovernmental. *Diplomatic intervention* is the issuance of threats or warning through official diplomatic channels without the actual movement of troops to influence some policies of, or domestic political outcomes in, the target country. Such interventions could involve either such conventional diplomatic techniques as withdrawing an ambassador or issuing a formal protest, or they could involve the use of less conventional economic or political actions through official channels to affect domestic outcomes. Thus, a denial of trade credits or a cutoff of economic aid could constitute a diplomatic intervention. This type of intervention is coercive in intent and is effected through the nonmilitary agencies of the intervening state.

Transgovernmental interventions involve the use of unofficial intermediaries in issuing threats or warnings, or in creating an atmosphere of uncertainty or discontent, in an attempt to directly affect policies or domestic political outcomes. A nonexhaustive list of types of intermediaries would include clandestine intelligence agents, multinational corporations, international financial institutions, and dissident social groups (e.g., labor unions, business groups, guerrillas, etc.). The term "transgovernmental" was originally coined by Samuel Huntington to deal with those types of international relations in which nation-states implemented their policies through bureaucratic channels not normally used for the conduct of foreign affairs (i.e., diplomatic and military).¹⁶ We are in somewhat shadowy territory here, of course, as what is considered "normal" has changed considerably over time, especially with increased knowledge about the use of covert and international economic agents by nation-states for state purposes. Also, it will not always be clear whether a specific intermediary is acting at the behest of a government. Consider the example of the attempts by ITT to directly channel funds to the opponents of Salvador Allende in the Chilean elections of 1970. The historical record seems to indicate that this attempt was made with the knowledge of the CIA but without the active support of the U.S. government or any of its

agencies. Nevertheless, the category of transgovernmental action is not difficult to operationalize because it is not usually difficult to distinguish between acts of official and unofficial agents.

Both military and transgovernmental interventions may have domestic effects on target governments without the use of direct threats. No direct threats are needed when actions are designed to undermine continued support of the government. All that is needed is a belief that the government of the intervening country is undermining the support of the target government. In the case of interventions designed to overthrow target governments, even that belief is not necessary because the attempt itself may be all that is required. All interventions involve coercion of some sort that is hostile to some political force within the target country. All interventions involve an intention to affect policies or domestic political outcomes. The policies may be either domestic or foreign policies. Thus, it would be possible for one country to intervene in the ways discussed here in order to influence the policies of a target government toward a dispute with a third government. The attempt to influence must, however, involve the use of coercion in some observable form.

Transgovernmental interventions, by definition, will obviously be more difficult to study systematically than military or diplomatic interventions. Covert activities are only revealed to the public through errors, as a result of defections, or as a way of building public support by advertising successes. One can expect the information to be reasonably good on the cases of extreme success or failure, but rather bad on the normal cases of mixed success. Multinational corporations and allied dissident groups have sound reasons for avoiding publicity of their activities on behalf of an intervening state. The study of diplomatic interventions, because of the need at some point to actually issue a threat or warning, should be somewhat easier, but even there it may be mutually advantageous to the parties to keep publicity to a minimum. Nevertheless, over a reasonably long period of time, case studies and other historical materials should provide a sufficiently accurate portrait of interventions to make at least some tentative conclusions about patterns and trends. The next section, in reviewing the existing case study and quantitative literature on interventions relevant to Latin America, demonstrates the potential feasibility of extending systematic study to nonmilitary interventions.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

The case-study literature on military interventions is vast; quantitative studies of intervention are not so numerous. Here, a review of the quantitative studies most relevant to the task of understanding military

interventions in Latin America will be combined with a brief discussion of some of the more careful case studies of major military and transgovernmental interventions in Latin America. Special attention will be paid to Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), the Dominican Republic (1965), Chile (1973), Grenada (1983), and Nicaragua (1981–present). Starting with the quantitative literature has the advantage of setting the global context for the regional case studies, but the disadvantage of reintroducing some of the terminological confusions to which we have alluded.

In table 3:1, a list of quantitative studies of interventions is given along with some information about the differences in the methods and purposes of the studies.¹⁷ In reviewing these studies, it will be useful to group them according to what they say about (1) properties of intervening states and their motivations, (2) properties of targets of intervention, (3) the variation over time in interventions and other conflictual activities, and (4) the distribution of interventions across regions.

Great powers account for the majority of interventions. Nevertheless, there are a surprising number of interventions by middle powers and even by minor powers. A frequently cited example is the intervention by India in Goa. A more recent example is the intervention of Vietnam in Kampuchea. Great powers, however, are not only more likely to engage in interventions, but are also less constrained by geography than lesser powers. Lesser powers are unlikely to intervene in distant countries.¹⁸ Declining great powers, like the United Kingdom, are relatively frequent interveners, but John VanWingen and Herbert Tillema argue that the UK is less likely than the superpowers to get involved in an intervention for the preservation of its former spheres of influence.¹⁹

The majority of interventions are “friendly”; that is, they are designed to aid the government of the target country. If one distinguishes between interventions that are designed to secure specific policy changes from those in which the intention is to affect the outcome of a domestic dispute, the former are far more likely than the latter to be hostile.

Properties of target countries that seem to make interventions more likely are (1) the fighting of structural (i.e., serious civil or insurgency) wars,²⁰ (2) internal weakness and inability to resist militarily,²¹ and (3) general instability.²² There is virtually no relationship between measurable economic interests of intervening countries in the target and the likelihood of intervention.²³

In several studies the early 1960s are identified as a period of unusually frequent intervention. William Eckhardt and Edward Azar suggest that the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed a dropoff in the rate of both serious conflicts and interventions.²⁴

Latin American interventions accounted for a sizeable proportion (57 out of the 215 total, or 27%) of Barry Blechman and Steven Kaplan’s list of uses of U.S. military forces for political purposes.²⁵ The half decade of

greatest U.S. activity in Latin America in their study was 1961–1965, in which 29 of the 57 incidents took place. In Steven Kaplan’s list of Soviet interventions, however, only three incidents took place in Latin America, all of them connected with Cuba.²⁶ This suggests that, on the military level at least, the United States remains much more willing to intervene in the region than the Soviet Union.

While nonmilitary interventions are not considered in any of these studies, and there are problems of comparing the studies because of different operationalizations of military intervention, there are a number of interesting regularities emerging from them that may be of use in understanding the phenomenon of intervention on a global and regional level. They appear to bear out the commonsense notion of the existence of more or less exclusive spheres of influence for the superpowers (especially for the United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe). They point to the continuing interventions of former colonial powers and the increasing tendency toward interventions of rising powers with no recent colonial past (e.g., India, the People’s Republic of China, Vietnam, etc.). Finally, they suggest that one of the main motivations behind intervention is maintaining stable and friendly regimes in weaker countries. The existing case-study literature on Latin American interventions is particularly helpful in reinforcing this last point.

Abraham Lowenthal’s analysis of the intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic in 1965 suggests that political ends were primary from the perspective of U.S. policymakers, even if their perceptions of the domestic political situation were extremely faulty. President Lyndon Johnson was convinced that the unrest in the Dominican Republic was the result of Communist subversion. His desire not to see another Cuba in the hemisphere was the main motive behind his decision to intervene militarily. Subsequent efforts to justify the belief of the president in a Communist conspiracy failed to convince large portions of the American public. The historical record appears to refute the claims of the Johnson administration on this matter.

The actual intervention was messy. The U.S. government found it difficult to identify which group to support in what was essentially a factional dispute among military leaders. The combat situation for the U.S. troops was quite hazardous. Eventually, a negotiated settlement was reached and order was restored. The U.S. government managed to extricate itself from the situation gradually over the next few years. No regime unfriendly to the United States emerged, but the intervention was costly in terms of U.S. relations with the rest of Latin America for at least a decade after the intervention. Mexico, in particular, took a stronger stand than it had in the past on the principle of nonintervention in international forums; the Organization of American States (OAS) was weakened as an effective regional peace-keeping force; Communist parties and insurgents

Table 3.1
Quantitative Studies of Military Intervention

Authors and Year of Study	Interveners	Targets	Period Studied
Blechman and Kaplan 1978 ^a	U.S. only	all	1946-1975
Butterworth 1978 ^b	all	all	1945-1976
Doran 1975 ^c	U.S. only	8 Carib.	1948-1964
Eckhardt and Azar 1978 ^d	all	all	1945-1975
Kaplan 1981 ^e	U.S., S.R. only	all	1944-1979
Odell 1974 ^f	U.S. only	all	1948-1969
Pearson 1974 ^g	all	all	1948-1967
Pearson 1974 ^h	all	all	1948-1967
Pearson and Baumann 1974 ⁱ	all	all	1948-1967
Pearson and Baumann 1977 ^j	U.S. only	all	1948-1967
Small and Singer 1982 ^k	all	all	1816-1980
Sullivan 1969 ^l	all	all	1948-1967
Tillema 1973 ^m	U.S. only	all	1946-1971
VanWingen and Tillema 1980 ⁿ	U.K. only	all	1945-1979
Weede 1978 ^o	U.S. only	all	1958-1965

^aBarry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978).

^bRobert Lyle Butterworth, *Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945-74: Data with Synopses* (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1978).

^cCharles F. Doran, *Domestic Conflict in State Relations: The American Sphere of Influence* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975).

were given an issue with which to convince potential supporters of the continued existence of "imperialism" in the hemisphere.²⁷

Recent accounts of the interventions in Guatemala²⁸ and in Chile²⁹ suggest that the combination of internal weakness and weak external support for incipient leftist regimes went a long way toward explaining the willingness of the United States to intervene. The domestic political mistakes of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and Salvador Allende were compounded by effective policies of destabilization on the part of the United States. In Guatemala, the destabilization efforts took the form of training and equipping the military forces of General Carlos Castillo Armas and providing air support for those forces, along with other covert activities of the CIA.

In Chile, primarily economic means were used by the United States to hurt the performance of the Chilean economy and thus undermine the domestic political support for Allende. U.S. policy was greatly assisted in this by the unfortunate economic policies of the Allende administration itself. Attempts to bring large proportions of both industry and agriculture under the control of the state resulted in major declines in production.

^dWilliam Eckhardt and Edward Azar, "Major World Conflicts and Interventions, 1947 to 1975," *International Interactions* 5 (1978), pp. 75-110.

^eStephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981).

^fJohn Odell, "Correlates of U.S. Military Assistance and Military Intervention," in Steven J. Rosen and James R. Kurth, eds., *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1974).

^gFred S. Pearson, "Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes," *International Studies Quarterly* 18 (September 1974), pp. 259-290.

^hFred S. Pearson, "Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 18 (September 1974), pp. 432-460.

ⁱFred S. Pearson and Robert Baumann, "Research Note: Foreign Military Interventions by Large and Small Powers," *International Interactions* 1 (1974), pp. 273-278.

^jFred S. Pearson and Robert Baumann, "Foreign Military Intervention and Changes in U.S. Business Activity," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 5 (Spring 1977), pp. 79-97.

^kMelvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982).

^lJohn D. Sullivan, "International Consequences of Domestic Violence," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1969.

^mHerbert K. Tillema, *Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment* (New York: T. Y. Crowell, 1973).

ⁿJohn VanWingen and Herbert K. Tillema, "British Military Intervention after World War II: Militance in a Second-Rank Power," *Journal of Peace Research* 17 (1980), pp. 291-303.

^oErich Weede, "U.S. Support of Foreign Governments: Or Domestic Disorder and Imperial Intervention 1958-1965," *Comparative Political Studies* 10 (1978), pp. 497-527.

Food imports rose dramatically. A huge balance of trade and payments deficit led to increased international borrowing, a major debt rescheduling crisis, and a curtailment of foreign capital flows.³⁰ The United States played a role here in ensuring that the Allende government would have difficulty arranging the refinancing of its debt obligations. The U.S. government actively blocked efforts to obtain bridging loans through the International Monetary Fund. Nevertheless, the rapid growth of the debt was more the result of domestic economic policies than of actions on the part of the United States.

The assassination of General Rene Schneider, commander-in-chief of the Chilean army under Allende who refused to prevent Allende from taking office, aborted a CIA-supported coup attempt in 1970. Subsequent support of Chilean military leaders who opposed Allende helped to create a political climate in which a military coup was more likely to occur.³¹ Since the coup did not occur, it was not included in the list in table 3.4.

The Bay of Pigs remains unique in that U.S. intervention there took place despite fairly strong external support for Cuba and in the presence of relatively high internal unity. Thomas Powers describes, however, how the chief CIA planners of the Bay of Pigs invasion grossly underestimated the internal strength of the Cuban regime at the time,³² while Irving Janis suggests that the U.S. policy suffered from errors resulting from insufficient internal debate on the policies proposed by Allen Dulles and the CIA in the early days of the Kennedy administration.³³ There continues to be substantial controversy over the reasons for the failure of the invasion, with many conservative commentators emphasizing the failure of the Kennedy administration to authorize sufficient air support for the invasion force of Cuban emigrés. It is clear, in any case, that much more direct involvement of the U.S. government than the Kennedy administration was willing to commit itself to would have been required to guarantee the success of the invasion.

Unfortunately, neither the quantitative nor the case-study literature has a great deal to offer in furthering an understanding of the prospects for intervention, for example, in contemporary Central America. Will the United States opt for a Bay of Pigs style invasion in Nicaragua? Or will it try to replicate the economic destabilization of Chile prior to 1973? Will U.S. troops be deployed in El Salvador as they were in the Dominican Republic (and Vietnam)? Or will assistance by U.S. advisers and training of indigenous military forces suffice to contain the leftist insurgency there? Obviously no great certainty about these matters can be obtained from an examination of the past. Still, a careful reanalysis and extension of the type of data discussed in the quantitative studies reviewed in table 3.1 might provide some additional insights into these important issues.

DATA ON INTERVENTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1945-1985

In an attempt to incorporate information on more recent interventions, both military and nonmilitary, in Latin America, some data have been collected on interventions in four different categories: (1) wars and other direct interstate conflicts, (2) insurgencies and insurrections, (3) coups, and (4) diplomatic/economic incidents. The data are displayed in tables 3.2 through 3.5.

Table 3.2 provides quick confirmation of the relative peacefulness of Latin America compared to other regions. There have been only two full-fledged wars since World War II, the "soccer war" between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 and the quite recent war between Argentina and Britain in the Falklands. None of the wars or border disputes have been terribly bloody and most have not lasted very long. The pervasiveness of the Organization of American States in interstate conflicts is marked, as is the relative infrequency of direct U.S. military intervention. Most diplomatic intervention is mediated by the OAS.

Table 3.3 shows how U.S. intervention is much more frequent in insurgencies and insurrections than in wars and interstate disputes. There is a decided tendency for the United States to support Latin American governments with counterinsurgency efforts. There are 21 cases of U.S. support for governments undergoing leftist insurgencies. Only two cases of proinsurgency interventions are securely documented—in Cuba in the early 1960s and in Nicaragua in 1979. In both cases, the insurgency was a left-wing insurgency. The United States has restrained itself only twice in recent years in supporting the government when a leftist insurgency is taking place, but the general pattern is clear and persistent.

Insurgencies in the late 1950s and late 1970s shared a greater likelihood of success than those in other periods studied. This is probably the source of increased concern in the United States, especially among conservatives, about growing unrest in Latin America. Table 3.3 provides some explanation for the current focus on Central America and the Caribbean in recent U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. With the exception of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, all the leftist insurgencies since 1970 in Latin America have been in those two subregions. Despite the greater probability of success in recent leftist insurgencies, however, it should be noted that the overall rate of success has been low (thanks to the very extensive counterinsurgency efforts of the United States during the late 1960s).

As in interstate conflicts, the United States appears to have avoided intervening frequently in coups (see table 3.4). The long-term support of military groups within Latin American countries usually has made it unnecessary for the United States to use military or diplomatic pressure in

Table 3.2
Wars and Other Direct Interstate Conflicts, 1945–1985

Parties ^a	Date	Sources ^b	Type of Conflict	Type of U.S. Intervention ^c
COS-NIC	1948	D, F	border dispute	diplomatic
DOM-HAI	1949	D, F	border dispute	diplomatic
COS-NIC	1955	B, D	border dispute	military
ECU-PER	1955	D, F	border dispute	diplomatic
HON-NIC	1959	D, F	border dispute	diplomatic
COS-NIC	1959	D, F	border dispute	diplomatic
CUB-USA	1960	B	border dispute	military
UKI-VEN	1962	D, F	border dispute	diplomatic
CUB-USA	1962	B	border dispute	military
BOL-CHL	1962	D, F	border dispute	diplomatic
DOM-HAI	1963	B, D, F	border dispute	military
PAN-USA	1964	B, D, F	canal riots	military
ARG-UKI	1965	Bu	border dispute	
GUY-VEN	1966	Bu	border dispute	
ELS-HON	1969	F	war	diplomatic
ECU-USA	1970	Bu	tuna war	diplomatic
PAN-USA	1971	Bu	canal dispute	
BLZ-UKI	1972	D, F	border dispute	diplomatic
CUB-USA	1972	B	seizure of ship	military
ARG-UKI	1975	K77	border dispute	diplomatic
GUA-UKI	1975	Bu	border dispute	
CHL-PER	1976	K77	naval incident	
COS-NIC	1978	F	border dispute	diplomatic
BOL-CHL	1978	Fo78, F	border dispute	diplomatic
ARG-CHL	1978	Fo78, F	border dispute	diplomatic
PER-USA	1979	Fo79	tuna war	diplomatic
ECU-USA	1980	Fo80	tuna war	diplomatic
ELS-HON	1981	Fo81	border dispute	
ECU-PER	1981	Fo81	border dispute	
ARG-UKI	1982		war	diplomatic
HON-NIC	1982		border dispute	transgovtl. ^d
NIC-COS	1984	Fo84	border dispute	
ELS-HON	1984	Fo84	border dispute	

^aAbbreviations of parties should be self-explanatory in most cases, but BLZ stands for Belize, GUY for Guyana, UKI for United Kingdom.

^bThe main sources were: B—Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978); Bu—Robert Lyle Butterworth, *Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945–74: Data with Synopses* (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1978); D—Jorge Dominguez, "Ghosts from the Past: War, Territorial and Boundary Disputes in Mainland Central and South America Since 1960," paper delivered at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, May 1978; F—John W. Ford, "Working for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the Western Hemisphere," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, D.C., January 1982; Fo78—the annual summary

the short term to affect the outcome of a coup. The most important exceptions to this rule are the Guatemalan intervention of 1954, the Brazilian coup of 1964, and the Chilean coup of 1973. In all three cases, a combination of clandestine and overt activities was used to help assure that a coup occurred and that it took the desired direction. The use of diplomatic pressures in 1978 to prevent a coup in the Dominican Republic and to support a "progressive coup" in El Salvador in 1979 were quite unprecedented. The Carter administration's policies in this regard were thoroughly rejected by the Reagan administration, however, so the pattern of the past was likely to be reestablished.

In table 3.5 a small and not necessarily representative sample of events are listed in which the United States intervened in a political or economic manner to affect policies or domestic outcomes. The reason this list is included is to demonstrate the increased concern for foreign investment policies in the 1960s and 1970s and with human rights in the late 1970s. There may be a slight tendency for the United States increasingly to use economic and nonmilitary political measures to influence the policies of Latin American countries, but not with any great success.

The early 1960s were a period of great turmoil in Latin America. In table 3.6 the incidence of wars, insurgencies, and coups reached a zenith in the 1961–1965 period. Wars and interstate disputes experienced a strong comeback in the late 1970s, insurgencies a somewhat weaker one. Coups, on the other hand, seemed to be tapering off. There was some evidence of an increase in nonmilitary conflicts in the fourth column of table 3.6, but because these data were incomplete, caution should be used in interpreting them.

As shown in table 3.7, interstate disputes, insurgencies, and coups have all increased in frequency in South America while declining or remaining approximately the same in the Caribbean and Central America. The main reason for growing concern about unrest in the latter seems not to be increased frequency of disputes, insurgencies, or coups but rather the increased probability of success of leftist insurgencies. Unrest in South America has become more the result of the spread of militaristic, authoritarian regimes (deemed safe) rather than of leftist rebellions. Table

volume of *Foreign Affairs* in 1978 (and similarly for later editions of this annual publication); and K77—*Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1977*.

^cAs Ford, "Working for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the Western Hemisphere" indicates, most diplomatic interventions occurred under the auspices of the Organization of American States.

^dThis refers to the likely CIA sponsorship of ex-Somozistas and Miskito Indians near the Honduran-Nicaraguan border as reported in the contemporary press.

Table 3.3
Insurrections and Insurgencies, 1945-1985

Country ^a	Dates	Orientation ^b	U.S. Pro-Govt.?	Type of Intervention	Source ^c	Successful?
DOM	1947	anti-Trujillo	?		B	no
BOL	1952	leftist	?		E&A	yes
CUB	1953	leftist	?		E&A	no (Moncada)
COS	1955	?	yes	military	B, D	no
CUB	1956-69	leftist	mostly	military?	E&A	yes
VEN	1958	anti-Jimenez	yes	military	B, E&A	yes
DOM	1959	leftist	yes		L	no
PAN	1959	leftist	yes	?	D	no
HAI	1959	anti-Duvalier	yes	military	B	no
CUB	1960-61	anti-Castro	no	transgtl.	B	no
GUA	1960-64	leftist	yes	military	B	no
NIC	1960	leftist	yes	military	B	no
DOM	1961-65	leftist	yes	military	B, E&A	no
PER	1962-65	leftist	yes	military	BI	no
GUY	1963-65	leftist	yes	military	B, E&A	no
VEN	1963-65	leftist	yes	military	B, BI	no
HAI	1963	anti-Duvalier	yes	military	B	no
MEX	1964	leftist	yes	transgtl.	B	no
URU	1965-72	leftist	yes	transgtl.	BI	no
BOL	1965-67	leftist	yes	military	E&A	no
COL	1965-67	leftist	yes	military	BI	no
GUY	1969				E&A	no
CUR	1969		yes	military	B	no
HAI	1970	leftist	yes	military	B	no
TRI	1970	leftist	yes	military	B	no
BOL	1970				E&A	no
CHL	1970-3	rightist	no	transgtl.	S	yes
GRE	1975-79	leftist	yes	military	K77	yes
GUA	1976-	leftist	yes	military	K77	no
NIC	1978-79	leftist	yes	military	Fo79	yes
DOM	1978	rightist	yes	diplomt.	Fo78	no
ELS	1980-	leftist	yes	military	Ins	
PER	1980-	leftist	yes	?	Ins	
NIC	1981-	rightist	no	transgtl.	Ins	
COL	1982-4	leftist	yes	?	Fo84	no

^aCountry abbreviations should be self-explanatory, but for Caribbean countries, CUR is for Curacao, GRE is for Grenada, and TRI is for Trinidad.

^bSome orientations could not be identified as of this writing. In the cases of broad-based opposition to a specific ruler, the leftist-rightist classification scheme was abandoned for the sake of greater accuracy.

3.8 shows that the United States was most likely to use military and transgovernmental forms of intervention in insurgencies and coups than in interstate disputes or diplomatic/economic events. Coups were more likely than insurgencies to involve transgovernmental forms, especially covert activities, probably because coups were more likely to involve antigovernment activities on the part of the U.S. government. There was a decided tendency for interventions in interstate disputes and diplomatic/economic events to involve diplomatic forms.

CONCLUSIONS

To summarize, there were corresponding rises and falls in the incidence of various types of events that normally create a climate favorable to U.S. intervention in Latin America; that is, interstate disputes, coups, and insurgencies. The early 1960s were the most active years, but the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a return to high levels of activity after the relative quiescence of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The United States was much more prone to intervene in insurgencies than in coups, and in interstate conflicts the OAS often provided a channel for U.S. diplomatic intervention. While the OAS continued to play a mediating role between the United States and Latin America, that role changed somewhat from merely providing another avenue for the exercise of U.S. influence to becoming more of a forum for multilateral diplomacy. The United States remained most concerned with insurgencies, particularly with leftist insurgencies in the region, and usually acted directly in those cases without the mediation of the OAS.

The tendency of the United States to introduce military troops directly was on the decline during the period of this study. The increased use of military and economic aid and various instruments of diplomacy instead of direct military involvement was the general pattern, although the policies adopted by the Reagan administration in Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua marked somewhat of a return to earlier patterns. Public support for direct military interventions remained pretty weak.³⁴

^cSources are abbreviated as in table 3.2, but several additional sources were used: BI—Cole Blasler, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolution Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), p. 244; E&A—William Eckhard and Edward Azar, "Major World Conflicts and Interventions, 1946 to 1975," *International Interactions* 5 (1978), pp. 75-110; L—Abraham Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); S—Paul Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Ins—"Insurgencies Shift from Left to Right," *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 26, 1984, p. 7.

Table 3.4
Coups, 1945-1985

Country	Date	Type of U.S. Intervention	Source
Brazil	1945		E&A
Haiti	1946	military	B
Paraguay	1947		E&A
Cuba	1952		E&A
Colombia	1953		E&A
Guatemala	1954	transgovtl.	Baily 1976; Powers 1979
Honduras	1955		E&A
Argentina	1955		E&A
Colombia	1956		E&A
Haiti	1957		E&A
Venezuela	1958		E&A
El Salvador	1960		E&A
El Salvador	1961		E&A
Dominican Rep.	1961	military	B
Ecuador	1961		E&A
Argentina	1962		E&A
Peru	1962	transgovtl.	Baily 1976
Guatemala	1963		E&A
Dominican Rep.	1963		E&A
Panama	1963		E&A
Ecuador	1963		E&A
Brazil	1964	military	B, E&A
Bolivia	1964		E&A

Table 3.4
(continued)

Country	Date	Type of U.S. Intervention	Source
Argentina	1966	diplomatic?	Baily 1976
Ecuador	1966		E&A
Peru	1968	transgovtl.	Baily 1976; E&A
Panama	1968		E&A
Argentina	1970		E&A
Bolivia	1970	transgovtl.	E&A
Argentina	1971		E&A
Honduras	1972		E&A
Ecuador	1972		E&A
Chile	1973	transgovtl.	Powers 1979
Uruguay	1973		E&A
Argentina	1976		K77
Honduras	1978		Fo78
Grenada	1979		Fo79
El Salvador	1979	diplomatic?	Fo79
Bolivia	1979	diplomatic	Fo79
Suriname	1982	diplomatic	Fo82
Bolivia	1982		Fo82
Grenada	1983	military	Fo83
Suriname	1984		Fo84

Note: Source abbreviations are the same as in tables 3.2 and 3.3. Baily 1976 is Samuel L. Baily, *The United States and the Development of South America* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976); and Powers 1979 is Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Pocket Books, 1979).

Table 3.5
Diplomatic/Economic Incidents, 1945-1982

Country	Date	Precipitating Event	U.S. Intervention	Source
Chile	1946	Kennecott strike	diplomatic	Baily 1976
Chile	1946	inauguration	military	B
Uruguay	1947	inauguration	military	B
Honduras	1954	elections	military	B
Argentina	1963	cancellation of oil contracts	diplomatic	Baily 1976
Chile	1964	election	transgovtl.	Powers 1979
Peru	1969	expropriation of U.S.-owned properties.	diplomatic	
Chile	1970	elections	transgovtl.	Powers 1979
Haiti	1971	death of Duvalier	military	B
Ecuador	1973	OPEC price incr.	diplomatic	Baily 1976
Venezuela	1973	OPEC price incr.	diplomatic	Baily 1976
Peru	1976	nationalization of Marcona	diplomatic	K77
Brazil	1976	German nuclear deal	diplomatic	K77
Chile	1976	human rights	diplomatic	K77
Dominican Rep.	1978	elections	diplomatic (to prevent coup)	Fo78
Chile	1979	Letelier case	diplomatic	Fo79
Nicaragua	1981	aid to El Salvador	diplomatic	Feinberg 1981
Cuba	1982	travel/tourism	diplomatic	Fo82
Argentina	1982	govt. spending	diplomatic	Fo82

Note: Sources are abbreviated as in table 3.4; Feinberg 1981 is Richard Feinberg, "Central America: No Easy Answers," *Foreign Affairs* 59 (Summer 1981), pp. 1121-46.

Table 3.6
Changes in the Incidence of Wars, Interstate Disputes, Coups, and Diplomatic/Economic Incidents over Time, 1945-1985

Period	Wars and Interstate Disputes	Insurgencies under Way	Coups	Diplomatic/Economic Incidents
1946-1950	2	1	2	3
1951-1955	2	3	5	1
1956-1960	3	8	4	0
1961-1965	6	11	11	2
1966-1970	3	8	6	2
1971-1975	5	1	5	3
1976-1980	6	4	5	5
1981-1985	6	4	4	3
TOTAL	33	40	42	19

Source: Tables 3.2 to 3.5.

Table 3.7
Wars, Interstate Disputes, Insurgencies, and Coups in the Caribbean, Central America, and South America, 1945-1984

Region	Period	Wars and Disputes	Insurgencies in Progress	Coups
Caribbean and Central America	1945-64	9	13	11
	1965-84	10	12	6
South America	1945-64	3	8	12
	1965-84	11	10	14

Source: Tables 3.2 to 3.5.

Table 3.8
Type of U.S. Intervention by Type of Event, 1945-1985

Type of Event	Type of Intervention			Total
	Military	Trans- governmental	Diplomatic	
Insurgencies	20	5	1	26
Coups	4	5	4	13
Wars and Interstate Disputes	6	1	17	24
Diplomatic Economic	4	2	13	19
TOTAL	34	13	35	82

Source: Tables 3-2 to 3-5

As for interventions by great powers other than the United States, Britain remained the main country with a tendency to involve itself directly in a military fashion in the region. Cuba was active in supporting leftist insurgencies. The question of the extent to which Cuba acts as a proxy for the Soviet Union has been raised in a number of places.³⁵ There seems to be no consensus on this matter, but the more convincing case is made for the notion that the Cubans received relatively little direct support for their action (and quite a lot of opposition in the 1960s) while receiving substantial indirect support, especially for their more recent activities. The failure of the Soviets to come to the aid of Allende in a major way in the early 1970s and their caution in supporting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua more recently suggests that the Soviets are highly constrained in their Latin American activities.

Rather than a rapid escalation of direct superpower competition for influence in the region, the historical record seems to point to a gradual change in the nature of U.S. influence. Many reasons can be suggested for this change: a general reduction in the utility of force in relations between great and lesser powers, an increasing revulsion of the populace of the United States to the available methods for suppressing insurgencies, and a consequent increased reliance on generally less effective, nonmilitary

methods of controlling the direction of change. The Soviet Union may be undergoing a similar gradual erosion of its ability to control events in its sphere of influence, most notably in Eastern Europe, but it is certainly not as constrained by domestic politics as is the United States.

Thus, a continued and constrained presence of the United States in Latin America was the most likely response to increased violence in Central America and increased use of military force in South America. The Caribbean Basin Initiative, a plan put forth in 1981-1982 by the Reagan administration to grant access to exports from the Caribbean and Central America to the United States along with a number of other forms of aid, was designed to create economic conditions less conducive to insurgencies in the long term, while providing a means for discriminating against "unfriendly" regimes in the short term. Economic destabilization of Sandinista Nicaragua is just as possible as was the economic destabilization of the Allende regime in Chile or of the Manley regime in Jamaica. The need for a number of South American governments to reschedule their debt repayments in the 1980s will provide multiple opportunities for more subtle forms of U.S. intervention.

There should be no question from the studies and original data discussed here that the United States was a hegemonial power, with a clear sphere of influence in Latin America. Like any great power, it used coercive methods to intervene in the affairs of weaker countries within its sphere of influence. The success of those interventions, measured in terms of the mostly antileftist goals of the U.S. government, was substantial. Yet, the cost in terms of long-term U.S.-Latin American relations was also substantial.

In Central America and the Caribbean, social foment arising from long histories of domestic repression by firm allies of the U.S. government are presenting the United States with the prospect of providing external support for increased repression (the option of *explicit state terror*) or moving away from its traditional opposition to all leftist political movements and regimes. Domestically, the people of the United States remain divided on which of these two paths to follow.

It is not a decline in global military power that is creating this choice for the United States, but rather the disunity of its public in the face of impending social changes in neighboring countries. If the Reagan administration or some successor administration succeeds in dealing with the situation at low levels of commitment by undermining or destabilizing leftist regimes (as in Grenada and Nicaragua) or in shoring up right-wing regimes by forcing them to incorporate more moderate political elements (as in El Salvador), then things can continue as they have in the past. But as long as the U.S. definition of a "friendly" regime excludes all leftist regimes, and as long as the American public remains ambivalent about explicit policies of state terror, the adoption of a policy of explicit state

terror may have the unanticipated effect of forcing the public to reexamine the assumptions behind the opposition of all leftist regimes in Latin America.

NOTES

1. Latin America will be used to refer to the Caribbean, Central America, and South America.
2. Edy Kaufman, *The Superpowers and Their Spheres of Influence* (London: Croom Helm, 1976), p. 10.
3. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary* 68 (November 1979), pp. 34-45.
4. Michael Stohl, "National Interests and State Terrorism in International Affairs," *Political Science* 36 (July 1984), p. 38.
5. See for example, Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
6. Stohl, "National Interests"; Christer Jonsson, *Superpower: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).
7. Terry V. Thiele, "Norms of Intervention in a Decolonized World," *New York Journal of International Law and Politics* II (Spring 1978), pp. 141-74.
8. Manfred Halpern, "The Morality and Politics of Intervention," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 252, defines intervention as "any action, beginning with deliberate or remediable interaction among nations, that significantly affects the public internal realm of another sovereign state and which stops short of the aggressive crossing of international frontiers."
9. See also Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), ch. 6.
10. William V. O'Brien, *U.S. Military Intervention: Law and Morality* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979).
11. James N. Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention," *Journal of International Affairs* 22 (1968), pp. 165-76; James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13 (June 1969), pp. 149-71.
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14. Fred S. Pearson, "Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes," *International Studies Quarterly* 18 (September 1974), p. 261.
15. William Eckhardt and Edward Azar, "Major World Conflicts and Interventions, 1943 to 1975," *International Interactions* 5 (1978), p. 96.
16. Samuel Huntington, "Transnational Organizations and World Politics," *World Politics* 25 (1973), pp. 333-68.
17. This review extends somewhat the excellent one to be found in Michael Stohl, "The Nexus of Civil and International Conflict," in Ted Gurr, ed., *Handbook of Political Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1980).

18. Fred S. Pearson, "Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 18 (September 1974), pp. 432-60.
19. John VanWingen and Herbert K. Tillema, "British Military Intervention after World War II: Militance in a Second-Rank Power," *Journal of Peace Research* 17 (1980), pp. 291-303.
20. John D. Sullivan, "International Consequences of Domestic Violence" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1969).
21. Charles F. Doran, *Domestic Conflict in State Relations: The American Sphere of Influence* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975); Erich Weede, "U.S. Support of Foreign Governments: Or Domestic Disorder and Imperial Intervention 1958-1965," *Comparative Political Studies* 10 (1978), pp. 497-527.
22. John S. Odell, "Correlates of U.S. Military Assistance and Military Intervention," in Steven J. Rosen and James R. Kurth, eds., *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1974).
23. Odell, "Correlates"; Fred S. Pearson and Robert Baumann, "Foreign Military Intervention and Changes in U.S. Business Activity," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 5 (Spring 1977), pp. 79-97.
24. Eckhardt and Azar, "Major World Conflicts."
25. Barry Blechman and Steven Kaplan, *Force Without War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978).
26. Stephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981).
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30. Paul E. Sigmund, *Multinationals in Latin America: The Politics of Nationalization* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), pp. 166-67.
31. *Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).
32. Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Pocket Books, 1979).
33. Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).
34. John E. Mueller, "Changes in American Public Attitudes Toward International Involvement," in Ellen P. Stern, ed., *The Limits of Military Intervention* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977); "Poll Finds Only 33% Back Reagan's Latin Policy," *New York Times*, April 29, 1984, p. 1.
35. Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorship"; Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Fall 1978), pp. 83-108; Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Cuban Experiences with Soviet Models of Development," in Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry, eds., *Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World* (New York: Praeger, 1975); Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Cuba's African Adventure,"

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