

Globalization and Anti-Globalization:  
An Agenda for Empirical Research

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## **Introduction**

The rise of political movements opposing globalization is a new feature of international politics. There have been localists, isolationists, nationalists, regionalists, and internationalists in previous times, but the ideas behind both globalization and anti-globalization are of relatively recent origins. The term “globalization” only began to appear frequently in scholarly works on international political economy (IPE) in the 1990s. Now it is difficult to find books on IPE without the word somewhere in the title.

Proponents and opponents agree that globalization is not the same as internationalization.<sup>1</sup> One way to define globalization is in terms of an increase in international interconnections, or interdependence, but its distinctiveness from interdependence derives primarily from the increased role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the contemporary world economy. The MNCs of the post WW2 period are different from firms of earlier periods in being more focused on manufacturing and services than on extraction of raw materials and commodities and more likely to be financed by a combination of foreign direct investment (FDI) and local capital rather than international portfolio investments. In addition, contemporary MNCs are the predominant owners of proprietary technology. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, competing MNCs from a growing number of economies have created geographically dispersed “value chains” to take advantage of lower R&D, production, and distribution costs made possible by lower barriers to trade and investment flows.

Another meaning of globalization is broader than the one discussed above. “It implies a diminishing importance of national borders and the strengthening of identities

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<sup>1</sup> This distinction is drawn most clearly in Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

that stretch beyond those rooted in a particular region or country.”<sup>2</sup> This definition includes ideas of de-territorialization, the global spread of technologies and ideas, the rising political importance of diasporic communities, and the growth of transnational organizations and political movements.<sup>3</sup> I will argue below that the empirical literature tends to focus on economic globalization and mostly neglects the problem of measuring non-economic aspects of globalization. While this is a sensible way to start empirical research, there needs to be more empirical work on the broader concept.

The opponents of globalization focus not just on MNCs but also on international organizations and regimes like the Group of 7 (G-7), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Economic Forum (WEF), and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). They believe these organizations and regimes are worthy targets for protest because they institutionalize or embody the power of MNCs and other globalizing forces. Opposition takes the form mainly of political movements in which the main participants are loose coalitions of activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Thus, one important hypothesis of the literature on anti-globalization is that the various anti-globalization movements may constitute an important step in the development of a transnational, and perhaps even a global, civil society.

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<sup>2</sup> Susan V. Berresford, *President's Message: 1997 Ford Foundation Annual Report* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1997), p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), ch. 2; John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity* (New York: Routledge, 1998), Part II; Benjamin J. Cohen, *The Geography of Money* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), chaps. 1-2; Ann M. Florini, ed., *The Third Force: the Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000); Dieter Rucht, “The Transnationalization of Social Movements: Causes and Problems,” in Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi and Dieter Rucht, eds., *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (London: Macmillan, 1999); and others.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a synthetic overview of the politics of globalization and anti-globalization and to propose an agenda for further research. I will start by providing a snapshot of the current status of empirical analysis of economic globalization. Then I will try to summarize the work on the activities of anti-globalization activists in the last six or seven years. I will conclude with some questions for future research.

### **Empirical Analysis of Economic Globalization**

Economic globalization is the increasing integration of input, factor, and final product markets coupled with the increasing salience of MNCs in the world economy and their creation of cross-national value-chain networks.<sup>4</sup> I review below some evidence for trends indicating movement toward greater globalization of the world economy in the financial, trade, and investment realms at the end of the twentieth century.

#### *Financial Globalization*

A revolution in telecommunications, information processing, and computer technologies made possible a vastly increased volume, speed, and global reach of financial transactions. The growing sophistication of financial players reinforced deregulation and the technological revolution. The concentration of capital in institutions, such as pension funds, mutual funds, money market funds, and insurance companies, reinforced the trend toward sophisticated, global management of large pools of capital.

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<sup>4</sup> “Introduction” in Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey A. Hart, eds., Globalization and Governance (London: Routledge, 1999).

Professional managers of such funds, operating in an environment of volatile prices, exchange rates, and interest rates, were increasingly willing to move money across international boundaries to diversify risk and take advantage of market differentials.<sup>5</sup>

As a result of these multiple forces, global financial markets exploded in size and became a major influence on the floating exchange rate system. World financial flows exceeded trade flows by a factor of at least 30 to 1.<sup>6</sup> By 1992, total cross-border ownership of tradable securities had risen to an estimated \$2.5 trillion. Many of these assets were short-term holdings in foreign currencies and securities and therefore highly liquid investments. Net daily turnover in nine of the major national markets for foreign currency was approximately \$600 billion in 1989.<sup>7</sup>

The end of the Cold War had a profound impact on the international economic system. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communism, the political bases of the global economy shifted dramatically. The great divide between the capitalist and communist worlds and their respective economic systems disappeared. The ideology and practice of capitalism spread to Eastern Europe, Russia, its former republics, and even to China and Viet Nam. Developing countries which had opposed the liberal international economic order chose to join the prevailing consensus. Financial institutions from developed countries responded quickly to the new liberalization in

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<sup>5</sup> Excellent documentation of this trend can be found in Barry Eichengreen, *International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1994), 65–66.

<sup>6</sup> See *World Financial Markets*, September/October 1987; and Robert Wade, “Globalization and the State: What Scope for Industrial Policies,” in Susanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., *Convergence or Diversity? National Models of Production and Distribution in a Global Economy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).

<sup>7</sup> Eichengreen, *International Monetary Arrangements*, 60; *BIS 71<sup>st</sup> Annual Report* (Basel: BIS, 2001), p. 98.

developing and former communist countries. As a result, international financial flows increased dramatically. Thus, the system became truly global from a geographical perspective.

The revolution in information technology enhanced this shift in government policy. The global diffusion of information technology made it possible for people around the world to trade foreign exchange and stocks at any time of the day.<sup>8</sup> The Forex system, for example, allowed individuals or firms to trade in foreign currencies on a 24-hour basis. Similar systems were developed for equity market and futures trading. New regulations allowed the creation of electronic trading systems giving investors direct access to markets, and thereby eliminating or reducing the role of intermediaries like the traditional stock brokerage houses. The new technology forced banks and investment firms to create new financial services to replace revenues that had been lost as a result of reduced trading fees.

Similar changes occurred in other countries such as Japan, Great Britain, and Mexico. As those countries replaced traditional trading floors with electronic trading systems, they realized reduced costs, increased speed of execution, and improved efficiency.

Another characteristic of financial globalization was the proliferation of securities markets. Many countries that had not previously had a stock market or other kinds of markets for trading in securities established such markets for the first time in the 1990s. Other countries that already possessed such markets improved or enhanced them.

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<sup>8</sup> David Fairlamb, "Online Money Trading Takes Off," *Business Week*, September 3, 2001, at [http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/01\\_36/b3747154.htm](http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/01_36/b3747154.htm).

Financial institutions increasingly became truly global in operations and ownership. A new wave of mergers and acquisitions resulted in the creation of larger banks in the United States, Europe, and Japan. About 400 bank mergers occurred each year in the United States. The number of banking organizations in the United States decreased from approximately 12,300 in 1980 to approximately 7,100 in 1998. The percentage of domestic deposits held by the 100 largest organizations increased from 47 percent in 1980 to nearly 69 percent in 1997.<sup>9</sup> In the 1990s, the number and value of bank mergers and acquisitions in the major industrialized countries increased markedly. Many large banks merged to form even larger banks. As a result, concentration of ownership in the financial services industry rose substantially during this period.<sup>10</sup>

### *Trade and Globalization*

After World War II, economic growth, trade liberalization, decreasing transportation costs, and broadening business horizons led to a surge in trade among the developed market economies.<sup>11</sup> Merchandise trade among the developed countries more than quadrupled between 1963 and 1973; increased over two-and-one-half times from 1973 to 1983; and grew more than two times again between 1983 and 1993.<sup>12</sup> From 1960

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<sup>9</sup> Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., "The Changing Banking Environment and Emerging Questions for Public Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, June 1998, <http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/pubs/region/98-06/ferguson.html>.


<sup>10</sup> Bank for International Settlements, Group of Ten, *Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector* (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, January 2001), <http://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.htm>.

<sup>11</sup> Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 59–80.

<sup>12</sup> General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, *International Trade, 1986–1987* (Geneva: GATT, 1987), 158; and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, *International Trade, 1990–1991*, vol. 2 (Geneva: GATT, 1991), 78.

to 1998, the percentage of GDP derived from trade (exports plus imports) went from 9.6 to 23.9 percent in the United States, from 35.5 percent to 56 percent in Germany, and from 14.5 percent to 49.6 percent in France. Trade over GDP remained steady and low in Japan and steady and high in Britain.

### Growth in World Exports, 1958-2000, in Billions of Current Dollars



Source: International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* (various years).


#### *Investment and Globalization*

From 1971 to 2000, the stock of U.S.-owned direct investment abroad measured by book value rose from \$86.2 billion to \$1.3 trillion. Direct investment by other developed countries, though smaller than U.S. investment, also rose sharply. From 1971 to 1998, the stock of direct investment by Germany rose from \$7.3 billion to \$390.1 billion, that of the United Kingdom from \$16.2 billion to \$498.6 billion, and that of Japan from \$4.4 billion to \$295.1 billion. The total stock of FDI worldwide was over \$6



trillion in 2000.<sup>13</sup>

### Outflows of FDI from Industrialized and Developing Nations, in Billions of Current Dollars, 1970-2000



Sources: United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations, *Transnational Corporations in World Development: Trends and Prospects* (New York: United Nations, 1988), pp. 503-510; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *World Investment Report* (New York: UN, various years).

Total annual outflows of FDI rose from around \$12 billion in 1970 to \$1.3 trillion in 2000. Growth in outflows tapered off after the deepening of the world debt crisis in the early 1980s, but resumed after that. Average annual growth in both outflows and inflows of FDI was over 18 percent in both the 1980s and the 1990s.<sup>14</sup> A slight downturn in the early 1990s occurred due to the decline in outflows of Japanese FDI and the U.S.

<sup>13</sup> UNCTAD, *World Investment Report* (New York: United Nations, 2001). Note that these figures are cited at book value, which means that they represent the historical value of the investments—that is, what they cost at the time of acquisition with no adjustment for inflation or changing market values since then. This means that the U.S. investments, which were generally made earlier, are undervalued. Although the increase in other countries' foreign direct investment is significant, the contrast would not be as sharp if all investments were measured at current market value.

<sup>14</sup> Calculated by the author from data in the *World Investment Report*. Average annual growth in exports of goods and services was only around 6 percent during the same decades.

economic recession that began in 1990 (more on this below). The aggregate trend in inflows of FDI worldwide mirrored that of outflows for the most part. While industrialized nations were by far the main sources and destinations of FDI outflows, developing nations steadily increased their share of total FDI inflows.

The top 500 MNCs accounted over 90 percent of global FDI and more than half of world trade by the late 1990s. 441 of the top 500 MNCs were headquartered in the triad countries of North America, Western Europe, and Japan.<sup>15</sup> Sales of foreign affiliates of MNCs were greater than world total exports, implying that MNCs used FDI as much as or more than they used exports to service overseas demand for their goods and services. In addition, FDI inward flows represented 11 percent of global gross fixed capital formation in 1998, up from 5 percent in 1990 and 2 percent in 1980, suggesting the growing importance of FDI in world economic growth.<sup>16</sup>

The FDI outflows and inflows of the five largest industrialized economies fluctuated widely in the last two decades of the century. All five large industrialized economies experienced rapid increases in outbound FDI in the 1980s. Japanese outflows, in particular, rose very rapidly in the 1980s and then declined rapidly in the early 1990s. Inflows of FDI into Japan remained low relative to those of other large industrialized countries. FDI inflows into the United States increased rapidly during the 1980s, reflecting the efforts of European and Japanese firms to establish economic beachheads in North America in a time of movement toward a more regionalized world trading system.

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<sup>15</sup> Alan Rugman, *The End of Globalization*, pp. 3-8.

<sup>16</sup> UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2000*; and Joseph M. Grieco, *The International Political Economy Since World War II*, Columbia International Affairs Online, <http://www.ciaonet.org/teach/es/grj01.html>.

With varying effectiveness, governments throughout the world adopted policies consistent with the so-called “Washington consensus”: deregulation, privatization, and international liberalization. Trade barriers were reduced; exchange controls removed; and investment bans eliminated. Former communist countries and developing countries joined the Bretton Woods institutions and agreed to play by their rules.

The impact of globalization, however, was uneven. The speed of economic change accelerated and flows of capital and goods became more volatile, causing rapid and sometimes wrenching changes for hundreds of millions of people. Many countries, companies, and individuals were beneficiaries of globalization. Numerous developing countries in Asia and Latin America prospered because they were able to attract foreign investment and technology and expand exports. Others, unable to compete on world markets or otherwise handicapped, were left behind. The poorest countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa, were unable to expand their trade or attract investment; they became ever more marginal.

### **Empirical Study of Non-Economic Globalization**

There are a variety of strategies for measuring non-economic globalization, some of which have been used either in globalization research or in related areas, but which are relatively underdeveloped in comparison with research on economic globalization. Before discussing these strategies, though, it might be useful to focus first on some of the key questions raised by theorists. To do this in an orderly way, I would propose dividing the work on non-economic globalization in the following categories: attitudinal, cultural, porousness of political boundaries, and environmental.

### *Attitudinal Globalization*

This category of research deals with the rise of pro- and anti-globalization beliefs in mass publics and elites. A strong interest in this topic among business executives was one of the reasons for the increased research activity on this topic. Businesses often run into a problem with managing employees who chafe at efforts of top management to inculcate globalist values in the workforce. Thus a number of researchers have undertaken the task of studying pro- and anti-globalization attitudes on the part of firm employees. While the purpose of this research is ostensibly to give management some new ideas about how to make their employees more globally oriented, the results may also be used to assess progress toward universal acceptance of what many theorists consider to be a key aspect of globalization: the belief that the national boundaries no longer matter (or that they should not matter).

### *Cultural Globalization*

The question here is the extent of the diffusion of global cultural artifacts and practices, where “global” can be interpreted in either a democratic, bottom-up fashion or in an imperial, top-down fashion. An example of this would be the assertion that the United States has become a cultural hegemon, promulgating its values through global cultural artifacts like movies, television, and pop music. That would be the top-down form. Alternatively, other theorists might stress the diffusion of cultural artifacts that represent the ideals and aspirations of the majority of the world’s population in the form of reggae or world music, for example.

Malcolm Waters seems to be mostly interested in this when he defines globalization as “A social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding.”<sup>17</sup> He goes on to claim that globalization is “the direct consequence of the expansion of European culture across the planet via settlement, colonization, and cultural mimesis.”<sup>18</sup> Thus, Waters is a scholar who has posited an imperialist, top-down view of cultural globalization.

It may be that neither the democratic nor the imperialist view is correct. Some scholars, like Appadurai, stress that cultural mimicry is always imperfect and that each culture chooses only certain aspects of a foreign culture to mimic or emulate and rejects others, usually without challenging basic cultural beliefs or practices in their own culture. Appadurai makes this point winningly in his discussion of the Indian acceptance and alteration of the British game of cricket in the last century.<sup>19</sup> **Foot note is on next page**

### *Globalization as Porousness*

One might define globalization in terms of the porousness of national boundaries or the growing importance of transnational linkages between countries that are the result of migration patterns, the building of global communications and transportation infrastructures, and economic interdependence. Economists sometimes measure this porousness by examining the international transmission of shocks such as wars, financial crises, or sudden price increases in raw materials. If the transmission is rapid or

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<sup>17</sup> Malcolm Waters, *Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 3.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

“frictionless” then that is evidence of greater porousness. If, on the other hand, national boundaries effectively insulate some countries from international contagion effects, that is taken as evidence against porousness.

### *Environmental Globalization*

Environmental globalization is somewhat different from the other forms discussed above in that scholars studying this topic tend to posit the existence of global environmental problems that require some sort of global response (along with local, regional, and national responses) and then examine the extent to which that response is forthcoming. They tend to claim that a global response is not politically likely unless there is a prior condition: the creation of global environmentalist movements. They then examine the evidence for the existence of such movements. Even in the presence of global movements, however, it still may be difficult for governments to respond because of the continued role of opposition forces in national and international politics.

Two examples of this would be research on the ozone layer and global warming debates of the recent past.

### **Empirical Study of Anti-Globalization Movements**

The empirical study of anti-globalization movements has focused primarily on protests and demonstrations that began in the mid 1990s and continued through the current decade. Table 1 below lists a selection of these events along with some information about their location, content, participants, etc. Other than the demonstration in Porto Alegre, Brazil, I have not included in Table 1 any of the protests against

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<sup>19</sup> Appadurai, chap. 5.

globalization that have taken place in the Third World (more on this later). The methods applied to this research were derived primarily from the literature on social movements, although a growing number of studies have begun to address the question of whether the new movements were actually transnational and whether they could be absorbed by political parties or older, more established social movements.<sup>20</sup>

Table 1. Anti-Globalization Demonstrations and Protests, 1995-2003

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>Participants</b>
May 1995	Bonn	G7 International Economic Summit	30,000 demonstrators:
1998	Berlin	IMF-World Bank	40-80,000 demonstrators: trade unions, leftist political parties, feminists, ecologists, civil rights groups, and Third World groups
1998	Geneva	WTO Ministerial Conference	3,000 demonstrators: Ant-Millennium Round Coordination
1998	Birmingham	G7 International Economic Summit	70,000 demonstrators: Jubilee 2000
1998	Paris	OECD Meeting about the MAI	Public Citizen; AFL-CIO; Sierra Club; the Western Governors Association; and the Women's Division of the United Methodist Church
Jun 1999	Cologne	G7/8 International Economic Summit	30,000 demonstrators: Inter-Continental Caravan for Solidarity and Resistance '99; Jubilee 2000
Nov 1999	Seattle	WTO Ministerial Meeting	Network for Global Economic Justice; Ruckus Society; Rainforest Action Network; Direct Action Network; Mobilization for Social Justice; Corporate Watch; Fifty Years is Enough; Public Citizen; German Green Party; AFL-CIO; Teamsters, Sierra Club; and Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
Apr 2000	Washington, D.C.	IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting	20,000-30,000 demonstrators: Mobilization for Global Justice; 50

<sup>20</sup> Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).

			Years Is Enough, Earth First!, DC Lesbian Avengers, DC Statehood, Green Party, Democratic Socialists of America, Direct Action Network, AFL-CIO, Mexico Solidarity Network, National Queer Commission, National Young Democratic Socialists, Native Forest Network, Progressive Librarians Guild, Rainforest Action Network, Reform the World Bank Campaign, Ruckus Society, Solidarity, Southern Appalachian Biodiversity Project, STITCH (Support Team International for Textileras), Student Peace Action Network
Apr 2000	Los Angeles	Democratic National Convention	Direct Action Network, D2K Network, American Friends Service Committee, Sweatshop Watch, Immigrants Rights
Sep 2000	Prague	IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting	10,000 demonstrators: Initiative Against Economic Globalization
Sep 2000	Melbourne	World Economic Forum	S11 Network: Friends of the Earth, Social Workers, Jubilee 2000, others
Nov 2000	Cincinnati	Trans Atlantic Business Dialogue	Cincinnati Direct Action Collective, Coalition for Human Rights of Immigrants,
Nov 2000	Quebec City	Free Trade Area of the Americas	Black Bloc; Medieval Bloc; Canadian Labour Congress: The Dandelions; Common Front Against the WTO
Dec 2000	Nice	EU Summit	70,000 demonstrators: European Confederation of Unions, ATTAC, immigrant rights groups, environmental groups
Apr 2001	Washington, D.C.	IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting	
Jun 2001	Gothenburg	EU Summit	Friends of the Earth; ATTAC
Jul 2001	Genoa	G7/8 International Economic Summit	200,000 demonstrators: Black Bloc, Jubilee, Friends of the Earth
Feb 2002	New York	World Economic Forum	10,000 demonstrators: Act Now to Stop War and Racism; Another World is Possible
Sep 2002	Washington, D.C.	IMF/World Bank, G-7 and G-24 Finance Ministers	8,000-10,000 demonstrators: Mobilization for Global Justice
Nov 2002	Sydney	WTO Meeting	Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network
Jan 2003	Porto	World Economic	100,000 demonstrators:



	Alegre, Brazil	Forum	
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Sources: Dieter Rucht, “Social Movements Challenging Neo-Liberal Globalization,” [http://www.wz-berlin.de/ag/poem/pdf/dieter\\_rucht\\_social\\_movements\\_challenging.pdf](http://www.wz-berlin.de/ag/poem/pdf/dieter_rucht_social_movements_challenging.pdf); web sites of news media, targeted organizations, and anti-globalization movements. Estimates of numbers of demonstrators are only approximate.

A number of observations can be made immediately from Table 1. The targets of anti-globalization protests are the G-7, the WTO, the IMF/World Bank system, the World Economic Forum, and the EU summits. A number of organizations or coalitions of organizations appear in the list of participants of multiple events: e.g., Jubilee 2000, Mobilization for Social Justice, ATTAC, and Friends of the Earth. These organizations or coalitions are sometimes focused on a small number of issues – such as Jubilee 2000’s focus on debt relief – but most are pursuing widely disparate ends with a broad array of tactics varying from conventional lobbying to street theater and direct action. Finally, there are very large numbers of participants in some of the events, especially the ones that occurred in large urban areas. One result has been for some of the targeted organizations to plan more recent events in remote locations or to separate the demonstrators from their meeting places by creating sites away from the main meeting area for demonstrators to hold meetings and rallies.

A systematic analysis of 919 anti-globalization protests between January 1, 1990 and June 30, 1992, that included protests in Third World locations, yielded the following results:

- the protests occurred in 105 countries in 324 separate locations;
- most of the participants in protests worldwide were in the developing countries (56% of 16 million participants);

- while there were more injuries in the developing world than in the developed world, there was about an equal number of fatalities;
- the region with the highest proportion of protest participants was Western Europe;
- protest frequency went down briefly after September 11, 2001, but recovered shortly thereafter; and
- there was a general trend toward accelerating protest activity with increasingly broad participation in anti-globalization events.<sup>21</sup>

Other studies focused on the types of organizations involved in the events, the ideological beliefs of participants, and the impact of globalization on levels of internal conflict. To conclude, there are a growing number of serious studies on anti-globalization protests that merits the attention of those who wish to contribute to the empirical analysis of globalization.

### **Conclusions**

There is a need for more empirical research in the non-economic aspects of globalization and in the rise of anti-globalization movements. There will continue to be innovations in theories of globalization and anti-globalization that do not depend on empirical research, but both theorists and practitioners in this increasingly important realm of politics could benefit from acquaintance with such research. There is a decided tendency for the proponents and opponents of globalization to engage in empty polemics that do nothing to advance the interests of their supporters. Social scientists may

contribute significantly to a more grounded discourse on globalization by filling the current gaps in empirical research.

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<sup>21</sup> Bruce Pobodnik, "The Globalization Protest Movement: An Analysis of Broad Trends and the Impact of Sept. 11," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, Ill., August 16-19, 2002.